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Trans adolescents who are denied puberty-blocking treatment (PBT) by 
unsupportive parents can -- and often do -- suffer devastating psychological and 
physical harms. In their insightful article, Maura Priest outlines these harms, 
drawing on substantial empirical evidence to show that trans adolescents’ 
experience of undergoing puberty of the “wrong” gender frequently results in 
serious, long-lasting, and potentially irreversible harms (Priest 2018, 16).  Among 1
these, Priest notes the vastly increased risk of suicide, future need for complex and 
costly surgeries, and self-medication with counterfeit and sometimes toxic 
puberty-blockers. Given all this, Priest argues that the state should reduce harms to 
trans youth by ensuring their access to PBT independently of parental approval 
(Priest 2018, 4). 
 
I support Priest’s proposal. Like Priest, I think the evidence regarding the effects of 
denying medical care to trans youth -- or, indeed, any trans person -- leaves little 
room to doubt that providing this care is crucial. And, like Priest, I believe that the 
state should intervene when parents deny crucial medical care to their children. 
 
That said, I have reservations about how Priest frames their argument. In what 
follows, I first briefly argue that this framing ignores additional social explanations 
for the psychological costs of denying PBT to trans youth. I then argue Priest relies 
on a cisnormative framework -- i.e., a framework that assumes certain bodily 
features ‘match’ certain gender identities -- that not only is philosophically 
treacherous, but also renders invisible nonbinary and gender non-conforming (GNC) 
youth. In closing, I suggest Priest’s conclusion would be strengthened by including 
arguments based on informed consent, in addition to harm reduction. 
 
 
 
1 Here and throughout the paper, I will use ‘they’ as a singular, gender-neutral pronoun. For 
philosophical reasoning behind this decision, see Dembroff and Wodak (2018). 
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1. Psychological harms aren’t just from the head 
 
Priest argues that denying trans youth PBT causes harms that are accounted for by 
an internal mechanism: gender dysphoria. Priest defines this dysphoria as “the 
feeling of disconnect and unease at the difference between one’s biological gender 
and one’s sense of gender identity”  (Priest 2019, 47). According to Priest, this 
“difference” is often “insufferable”, and is exacerbated for trans youth who undergo 
puberty of their assigned sex (47). Such insufferable dysphoria, Priest claims, 
explains subsequent psychological and physical harms.  
 
I don’t deny that gender dysphoria is an important explanation of these harms. But 
Priest’s argument suggests, by omission, that anti-trans stigma and discrimination is 
not an additional central explanation. This suggestion unnecessarily medicalizes 
trans identities, and also ignores nefarious social realities. While Priest does discuss 
negative health outcomes for trans youth with unsupportive parents, parents are but 
one piece of a larger system that demands and enforces gender conformity. This is 
not to downplay youths’ psychological discomfort or dysphoria. But even if such 
dysphoria were explained entirely apart from social factors -- which is dubious -- we 
must still ask why this dysphoria often is psychologically devastating. What is it 
about this ‘mismatch’ that leads trans youth to attempt suicide ten times more often 
than their peers? Placing the blame solely on gender dysphoria ignores the place of 
daily bullying and harassment in trans youths’ lives. PBT is needed not only to 
assuage an internal dysphoria, but also to help youth (who so choose) to navigate 
hostile social environments that give them vanishingly few options for socially 
legible and acceptable bodies.  2
 
2. Beyond the ‘mismatch’ model 
 
My second concern with Priest’s argument concerns its reliance on a version of the 
‘wrong body’ or ‘mismatch’ model of trans identity -- a model that prevails within 
discussions of trans medical care.  Talia Bettcher (2014, 383) describes this model as 3
one where “transsexuality involves a misalignment between gender identity and the 
2 For another example of a case where, it is argued, doctors should provide medical 
procedures to help patients cope with unjust social norms (while also working to change 
those norms), see Earp (2013). 
3 E.g., ‘‘For a person to be diagnosed with gender dysphoria, there must be a marked 
difference between the individual’s expressed/experienced gender and the gender others 
would assign him or her’’ (American Psychiatric Association (2013): gender dysphoria). 
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sexed body,” such that trans persons are “trapped in the wrong body.” While Priest 
does not use the ‘wrong body’ language explicitly, Priest does explicitly attribute to 
trans youth a “mismatch” between their bodies and gender identities. This model of 
trans identity has been sharply criticized by Bettcher (2014), Engdahl (2014), and 
Halberstam (1998), among others, who argue that it pathologizes trans persons, 
essentializes gender, reinforces the gender binary, and marginalizes trans men and 
women even when granted status as men and women. I set these arguments aside to 
focus on two criticisms of the ‘mismatch’ model as it is deployed in Priest’s 
argument. 
 
My first criticism concerns the argument’s failure to address nonbinary and GNC 
youth’s right to PBT. In particular, the argument’s framing suggests not only that 
certain sets of bodily features ‘match’ particular gender identities, but also that PBT 
is only needed by youth whose biological features ‘mismatch’ with their gender 
identities.  
 
To see why this is, we must begin with Priest’s claim that PBT is necessary for youth 
who suffer from gender dysphoria. Priest describes this dysphoria as affecting youth 
who “insist that they are the gender opposite the one on their birth certificate,” and 
then proceeds to describe these youth as struggling with “mismatch between their 
physical body and their gender identity” (Priest 2018, 48). From this framing, and 
through a variety of examples, Priest’s argument strongly suggests that certain 
bodily features ‘match’ certain gender identities: namely, masculinity and 
male-coded bodily features (facial hair, broad shoulders, etc.) ‘match’ male gender 
identity; femininity and female-coded bodily feature (breasts, low waist-hip ratio, 
etc.) ‘match’ female gender identity.  From this, it seems that Priest assumes that 4
adolescents’ right to PBT is predicated on their having an internal gender 
identification deemed a “mismatch” with their bodily features, such that PBT is 
needed to minimize the psychological harms of this mismatch.  
 
Consider an example. Suppose an adolescent was assigned male at birth and 
considers themself male, but nevertheless wants to begin PBT and eventually move 
on to hormone therapy. This adolescent does not, by Priest’s definition, experience 
gender dysphoria. They do not identify with a gender other than the one they were 
assigned at birth, nor do their bodily features ‘mismatch’ with their gender 
4 Priest (2018, 8): “PBT freeze the child in time physiologically. Hence, a transgender boy need 
not go through the horrors of developing breasts nor a transgender girl look in the mirror 
and see facial hair.” 
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identification. Yet, on my view, the adolescent in question is equally entitled to PBT 
as their trans peers. The fact that they identify as male does not render their desire to 
control their gender expression any less legitimate or important. To assume 
otherwise is to assume that there is a natural ‘match’ between male (or female) 
gender identification and a certain set of physical features, and furthermore, that 
only ‘trans’ and never ‘cis’ youth experience gender dysphoria, or desire gender 
nonconforming features.  
 
The example illustrates a larger, serious problem with Priest’s reliance upon the 
‘mismatch’ model: it renders invisible nonbinary and “cis” GNC youth (i.e., youth 
who identify with their assigned gender, but resist norms associated with this 
gender). Indeed, Priest’s paper fails to mention genderqueer or nonbinary youth 
even once. This is, to my mind, a shocking oversight. It is particularly shocking given 
that an estimated 30 to 40% of trans-identifying youth identify outside of the binary 
(Clark et al. 2018; ​Frohard-Dourlent et al. 2017; ​White et al. 2018)​. 
 
And yet, given the argument’s framing, this omission is easily diagnosable: there is 
no gender expression or set of bodily features that ‘match’ with nonbinary gender 
identification (Dembroff 2018; manuscript).  While some nonbinary youth seek out 5
PBT and other medical interventions, this is not due to identifying as nonbinary ​per 
se, ​because there are multitudes of ways to embody nonbinary identification. By 
basing adolescents’ right to PBT on a ‘mismatch’ between gender identification and 
bodily features, then, Priest’s argument undermines nonbinary and GNC 
adolescents’ right to this medical care.  
 
Granted, this framing is not unique to Priest’s argument. The medical establishment 
at large, including relevant academic literatures, has similarly marginalized 
nonbinary and GNC youth (Connolly et al. 2016). As Clark et al. (2018) shows, even 
though fewer nonbinary youth seek hormonal therapy than their trans binary peers 
(trans boys/men and trans girls/women), they are twice as likely to experience 
barriers accessing this therapy. This finding is echoed in Lykens et al (2018, 191), 
which describes nonbinary young adults as experiencing frustration and pressure to 
conform to binary gender narratives in order to access medical care. Given that 
Priest’s argument is entirely based on harm-reduction, and thus is beholden to 
5 While Priest could modify the concept of ‘mismatch’ so as to explicitly concern the 
individual’s experience of mismatch, whatever it may be, Priest’s current illustrations of 
mismatch repeatedly rely on stereotypical social expressions of femininity and masculinity as 
matching (or mismatching) with female and male gender identifications. 
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evidence of negative health outcomes for youth who are denied access to PBT, these 
findings suggest an urgent need to recognize nonbinary youth’s right to medical care 
such as PBT. As it stands, Priest’s argument leaves nonbinary and GNC youth 
without claim to this care. 
 
Moving on from this point, I have two further and related concerns about Priest’s 
reliance on a ‘mismatch’ framework. First, it sets up harm reduction, as measured 
through a psychiatric diagnosis, as the sole justification for youth’s access to PBT.  6
This forces trans and GNC youth to rely on others’ evaluations -- albeit those of 
medical professionals and not parents -- for access to PBT, rather than relying on 
self-evaluations concerning whether PBT would contribute to their flourishing. 
Second, for Priest, PBT is a needed step to reduce psychological harms that result 
from gender dysphoria. But why is psychological distress the lone gatekeeper for 
accessing PBT? What if PBT simply increased an adolescent’s flourishing, without 
their having previous psychological distress?  
 
Andrea Long Chu (2018) succinctly captures the dangers of this approach to trans 
medicine. If trans medicine “retains the alleviation of pain as its benchmark of 
success,” Chu writes, it allows authorities (such as doctors, parents, or the state) to, 
“with a dictator’s benevolence… withhold care from those who want it,” including 
whenever they deem potential harms from denying this care insufficiently serious.  7
Chu’s point is particularly salient given medical professionals’ history of 
discriminatory, humiliating, and dismissive treatment of trans patients -- a history 
that undermines confidence in their ability to assess these risks in a way that 
ultimately benefits trans patients. Chu’s argument should, I think, lead us to 
question both whether medical professionals are trustworthy evaluators of trans and 
GNC youth’s need for PBT, as well as whether psychiatric distress should be a 
prerequisite for their access to PBT. 
 
6 Of course, one could run a purely harm-reduction argument for youth access to PBT ​without 
relying on the wrong body model. However, this model is aptly suited for a harm-reduction 
model, as the term refers to the models used in diagnostic practices, all of which take 
“discomfort” and/or “dysphoria” as a necessary marker of being trans. For more discussion, 
see Engdahl (2014). 
7 Chu’s focus is on denial of care when accompanying risks are deemed too high, but Chu’s 
point also applies to cases where risks of ​not​ providing care are deemed too low to warrant 
providing care. 
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By focusing solely on harm-reduction as judged through the lens of psychiatric 
diagnosis, Priest becomes mired in a debate as to whether evidence that many trans 
children “revert back to their natal gender” defeats adolescents’ right to PBT. But 
Priest’s four arguments against this supposed defeater do not include the point that 
doctors, parents, and the state should not be, nor are qualified to be, “dictators” of 
adolescent bodies, particularly given that PBT does not result in permanent bodily 
alteration.  
 
Pulling back to a larger point, I think this and broader discussions of trans medical 
care would do well to integrate an “informed consent model” of trans care alongside 
considerations of harm reduction, gender dysphoria, and gender ‘mismatch’ (Schulz 
2018; Cavanagh, et al. 2016). On an informed consent model, access to gender-related 
medical interventions are not based on ‘fixing’ gender variance as a mental disorder. 
As Schulz (2018, 83) puts it, “[On this model], access to services is granted based 
primarily on the ability to consent to care, not whether or not the clients meets the 
criteria for psychiatric diagnosis.” In other words, this model recognizes an 
individual’s right to make decisions about their preferred gender expression, 
regardless of whether this expression clashes with cultural expectations, and 
independently of whether they experience psychological distress from gender 
dysphoria.  With the additional framework provided by this model, it becomes 8
clearer that trans, nonbinary, ​and​ ‘cis’ adolescents’ right to PBT is not only justified 
because it diminishes harms, but also because these youths should be given the 
autonomy to make a low-risk, impermanent decision regarding their preferred 
gender expression.   9
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